Is the SNP Fit to Govern?

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Is the SNP Fit to Govern?
By Douglas McCulloch PhD (Head of Policy, Sovereignty)

Introduction

Why is Mr Swinny’s plan a secret? If we are not fit to know what it is, perhaps we should assess the fitness of the SNP to govern.

Accountability

This is a democracy; as a people, we should be willing and able to hold our country’s government to account. Well, we’re willing all right, but we’re not able – where are the mechanisms to identify our Scottish government’s responsibilities? There is no obvious procedure for detecting what powers have been devolved to Edinburgh; we may find one when examining a particular issue, but there is no systematic procedure for assessing the performance of Edinburgh representatives. Also, I have been told that all Scottish planning applications have to be decided by Edinburgh, except projects for industrial or energy developments. How many projects does that leave for Scottish representatives to discuss?

Debt Management – The EU Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)

For the period before Scotland re-joins the EU, the SNP has committed us (Scottish Government (2022)) to imposing taxes, and agreeing lower expenditures, so that public debt in any year falls to a maximum of 3% of GDP, and total government debt falls to a maximum of 60% of GDP.

Which is a pity, because the cutbacks will produce conditions of austerity, by reducing activity, increasing household borrowing, and reducing expenditure in the rest of the economy, which will result in higher unemployment and worse levels of poverty. The SNP seem to believe that by conformity to the SGP, we will pass a standard of competence, to gain entrance to the EU. This is odd, because there are substantial EU countries which simply ignore these “targets”, without comment.

If this was only some kind of technical argument among economists, who (else) would care? But the fact is that austerity measures, carried out across the globe, have diminished life expectancy in many countries [Blyth (2013), Walsh and McCartney (2025)], without affecting inflation. If the SNP wish to run our country, they should not do it by reducing the average life span.

Debt Management – Scottish Government Bonds

Raising money seems to be a blind spot with the SNP – they are proposing (this year) to raise £3 Billion from the issuance of a “wholesale bond”, that is, one which is offered exclusively to investors in international markets. Anyone would think the SNP are trying to impress, but you do not get international finance to “crowd in” (as the SNP expects it to, apparently), and create another Switzerland, just by issuing one bond. The only crowd will be the one trying, when independence comes, to sell the wholesale bond, and as a result to destroy our new country’s progress, because we would no longer have the UK’s credit rating.

We are told that raising £3 billion from the wholesale market would cost an additional £160 million, compared to using a retail bond, sold to the general public (for example) in units of £100 each. The retail bond would be the same as cash, to its owner, and the interest would be income for Scottish residents, hence it would tend to stay in our economy, unlike the interest on a wholesale bond.

Change Management – The Road to Independence

The Scottish National Party claims to be working towards the independence of Scotland; why have they not, ever, used the value of Scotland’s oil in the Government Expenditure and Revenue Scotland (GERS) discussions? Data for this purpose has existed, at the least, since it appeared in Kemp and Stephen (1999), but the SNP have made no reference to any of these findings in recent discussions, at a time when independence seems to be imminent. There have been twenty-five years for the SNP to make their case based on that data, and now they have the work of Roy et al (2026), to provide figures for the impact on national income series. Can they count? Are they at all interested in the hard work, innovation, and long negotiations which will be necessary to make Scotland an independent country?

The lack of interest in the value of Scotland’s oil suggests a lack of interest in independence.

Accountability Again

We have been struck by the lack of serious exchange of views about these issues. Whoever takes control of the Scottish government in the future, we, the people, all of us, need to share our reasons, in this democracy, to create consensus. The elected members of the SNP, in particular, are appallingly silent. People who behave like kings, impervious to genuine discussion, are obstacles, not heroes.

We find Mr Swinny dismissing our citizen status and democratic role with a secret plan – if it is secret, we cannot fulfil our democratic role – and Westminster seems determined to limit our elected representatives’ ability to vet new projects. But perhaps the worst example is the determined assertion of a Scottish Government spokesperson (anonymously) quoted in Scotonomics (2026)), that the wholesale borrowing discussed earlier is borrowing “better – not more – by structuring debt more effectively” As a former banker myself (Midland Bank 1972-1974), I cannot find what this term “better” can refer to; there is no insurance against market movements! Certainly, government control of its own debt structuring (as in a retail bond issue) is bound to be better, for any government in charge of its own interest and budgetary measures, than a schedule decided, outside the government, by an investment banker managing the government’s portfolio. It follows inexorably that a retail bond is the best option, whenever independence is achieved.

The real flaw in the economic policies of the SNP is the Westminster habit of separating fund raising from business ventures. The United Kingdom keeps stumbling over missed opportunities because it fails to negotiate effectively with business and the other people involved (HS2 “planning” comes to mind). In the European fashion, the project should be agreed with all the parties, then find the money – if it’s worthwhile, the bankers will be on your doorstep before the ink is dry.

In the mean time, we need your help to oppose this useless expenditure of £160 million on a wholesale bond. Please contact your MSP, and the SNP, and ask for an explanation – why a wholesale bond, to borrow £3 billion, and not a retail one? The extra £160 million, which the wholesale bond would cost, will come out of our taxes. What, specifically, will we, the Scottish people, be getting in exchange for that money?

Many thanks.

Douglas McCulloch.

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Appendix – Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) Source

SNP commitment in 2022 to the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact (SGP):

“We would propose for the period before Scotland re-joins the EU, fiscal rules that were, as far as possible, aligned with the principles and the approach of any future EU Stability and Growth Pact” [Scottish Government (2022)] (that is, until further notice, public debt is annually to be a maximum of 3% of GDP, and Total government debt is to be a maximum of 60% of GDP.)

If these rules mattered, the interested reader would expect to have a statement of the values’ derivation, but there is none. Nonetheless, defaulting nations would be expected to reduce the debt, for example, with taxation receipts. Such redemptions have been part of counter-inflation packages; in the past, austerity policies have reduced incomes, employment, and activity, but not inflation. (See Austerity references for more details.)

Bibliography

Blyth M (2013) Austerity : The History of a dangerous idea Oxford University Press

Ehnts D and Thomson W (2025) Discussion Paper: Undermining Economic Resilience – The Economic Impact of Adopting the European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact in an Independent Scotland

Kemp A.G (2012) The official history of North Sea Oil and Gas. Whitehall histories: government official history series 2 vols (London 2012)

Kemp A and Stephen L Expenditures in and Revenues from the UKCS: Estimating the Hypothetical Scottish Shares 1970-2003 North Sea Study Occasional Paper No. 70 (Aberdeen, 1999)

Kemp A and Stephen L The hypothetical Scottish shares of revenues and expenditures from the UK continental shelf 2000-2013 (Archived Content: NRS Scotland 2008)

Roy G, MacKenzie NG, and Stewart S 70 years of Scottish National Accounts:1948 – 2018 The Economic History Review 2026 pp 1-25

Scotonomics (2026) Discussion Paper – On the Problem with Scotland’s Future Bond Plans Scotonomics 30^th March 2026

Scottish Government (2022) Building a New Scotland: A stronger economy with independence Scottish Government

Walsh D and McCartney G (2025) Social Murder? – Austerity and Life Expectancy in the UK Bristol University Press